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STATE REGISTRATION OF SECURITIES:  
AN ANACHRONISM NO LONGER VIABLE 
CHARLES H.B. BRAISTED 
In 1956, Louis Loss and Edward Cowett characterized the field of blue 
sky laws as a “statutory and administrative morass.”1 In 1969, Milton Gray, 
participating in a symposium, observed that although state authorities and the 
practicing blue sky law bar had taken a number of steps to ameliorate the 
situation, “the practice of blue sky law today seems still entangled in a 
morass, hopefully of a somewhat thinner consistency.”2 “The long-standing 
debate over state blue sky merit regulation of securities offerings recently has 
assumed a new intensity and practical significance.”3 While the debate no 
longer retains the intensity it had in 1956, 1969 or 1986, the morass remains. 
A number of articles and treatises give a detailed recitation of the history 
of blue sky laws, the reasoning behind the different approaches taken by 
federal and state legislators, and the arguments for and against each.4 There is 
no need to rehash the arguments here, pro or con. A cursory review of certain 
developments of the last fifteen years might be in order, however. 
The Revised Uniform Securities Act of 1985 (“RUSA”) raised the debate 
over state security registration to a higher and more urgent pitch. While 
RUSA did not eliminate states from the security registration process, it did 
lay out the groundwork for legislative activity that solved some of the more 
pressing problems of the day. RUSA included an exemption from securities 
registration for those securities authorized for trading on NASDAQ’s 
national market system,5 thus giving that exchange parity with the American 
and New York stock exchanges. Even though the states did not widely adopt 
RUSA, almost all passed the NASDAQ exemption into law between 1985 
and 1990. Thus much of the pressure on the states over the application of 
“merit” standards to new security offerings dissipated. 
At about the same time, the market for initial public offerings began to 
explode. The states, through their trade association, the North American 
Securities Administrators Association (“NASAA”), then began pressuring
 
 
 1. LOUIS LOSS & EDWARD M. COWETT, BLUE SKY LAW 44 (1958). 
 2. Milton H. Gray, Blue Sky Practice—A Morass? , 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1519, 1519 (1968). 
 3. AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON MERIT REGULATIONS OF THE STATE REGULATION OF SECURITIES 
COMMITTEE, Report on State Merit Regulation of Securities Offerings, 41 BUS. LAW. 785 (1986). 
 4. See id . at 785 n.1. 
 5. See Uniform Securities Act § 401(8), 7B U.R.L. 185 (Supp.1985). 
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the National Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”) to (i) raise its 
listing standards, (ii) apply those listing standards more strictly, and (iii) 
police more rigorously its own corporate governance provisions. Once again, 
the pressure on the capital-raising process increased. In 1996, Congress 
passed the National Securities Markets Improvement Act (“NSMIA”),6 
preempting the states in certain areas. 
Between 1985 and 1995, an annual cry for help could usually be heard 
emanating from the SEC-sponsored Government Business Forum For Small 
Business Capital Formation (the “Forum”). The Forum participants, 
including regulators, bankers, investors, accountants, entrepreneurs, lawyers, 
legislators, and representatives from a variety of governmental agencies, 
would gather to discuss ways to aid in the process of raising capital for small 
business ventures. Almost without fail, the Forum’s reports requested relief 
from the blue sky laws. The relief requested usually included a plea for a 
streamlined, inexpensive, non-merit based method of registering securities, 
an exemption from registration for a broader range of transactions, or both. 
The debate has begun once again in the aftermath of NSMIA—did 
Congress go far enough? At least one commentator has stated that NSMIA 
was a “failure” because it made only slight adjustments to the security 
registration process and did not deal effectively with the problems facing 
startups and smaller entrepreneurs.7 To be sure, NSMIA mandated 
uniformity in Rule 506 transactions, codified into federal law existing state 
exemptions for listed stocks, and provided relief from substantive state 
regulation of investment company securities. These changes were indeed 
only slight adjustments. The most significant substantive change made by 
NSMIA was the division of responsibility for the regulation of investment 
advisers. Moreover, NSMIA was the first successful attempt at federal 
preemption of the state securities laws, a welcome first step. 
The question of whether a role remains in our financial markets for 
continued state registration of securities must be reexamined in light of 
changes in the marketplace. Several factors merit consideration. When the 
states first enacted the blue sky laws, individual investors were not generally 
involved in the public securities markets outside of the northeast. No federal 
laws governed the sale of securities. American capital markets were in their 
infancy, and the public generally was neither well-informed nor particularly 
experienced in the matter of securities investments. The population was 
 
 
 6.  PUB. L. NO. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (Supp. II 
1996)). 
 7. Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Blue Sky Laws and the Recent Congressional Preemption 
Failure, 22 J. CORP . L. 175, 209 (1997). 
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generally agrarian and only modestly educated.8 In contrast, today’s 
investing public is generally literate, educated, inundated daily with 
investment and financial periodicals, exposed to financial analysts on radio 
and television,9 and can access financial news and analyses on their home 
computers. Moreover, changes in the funding of retirement plans and the 
establishment of IRAs and 401(k) plans have forced individual investors 
either to learn how to handle investments on their own or to seek professional 
advice. The SEC’s program to make prospectuses more readable and 
understandable has added to the maturity and sophistication of today’s 
investing public. 
Several attempts have been made to determine empirically whether merit 
regulation effectively deters fraud.10 The Wisconsin study compared11 the 
performance of securities registered in Wisconsin with the performance of 
securities denied registration there. Based on a small sample during a three 
year period (1968-1971), the study concluded that issues denied registration 
performed less well on average than those registered, notwithstanding 
evidence that, on a price per share basis, those denied registration 
outperformed those registered after one year, not falling behind until after 
three years.12 
In a study conducted by Ernest Walker and Beverly Hadaway,13 the 
results were inconclusive for similar reasons, although the study itself 
concluded that the data collected supported the Texas merit standards. Like 
the Wisconsin study, the Walker/Hadaway study revealed that, on average, 
the group of issuers that was denied registration outperformed, on a price per 
share basis, the group that achieved registration for the first year of the study, 
performed about the same in the second year, and fell behind in the third 
year.14 
Professors Mofsky and Tollison sharply criticized the methodology of the 
Wisconsin study and its a priori acceptance that blue sky regulation does not 
 
 
 8. See Hal M. Bateman, State Securities Registration: An Unresolved Dilemma and a 
Suggestion for the Federal Securities Code, 27 Sw. L.J. 759, 766 (1973). 
 9. See id. at 764. 
 10. See Conrad G. Goodkind, Blue Sky Law: Is There Merit in the Merit Requirements? , 1976 
WIS. L. REV. 79. See also  Ernest W. Walker & Beverly Bailey Hadaway, Merit Standards Revisited: 
An Empirical Analysis of the Efficacy of Texas merit Standards, 7 J. CORP . L. 651 (1982). A third 
study was conducted by Professors David Brophy and Joseph Verga of the University of Michigan 
Graduate School of Business. Copies of this report can be obtained from professor Brophy or the 
Business Law Section of the ABA. 
 11. See Goodkind, supra  note 108, at 107-23. 
 12.  See id. at 111-12. 
 13. See Walker & Hadaway, supra  note 8. 
 14. See id. at 674.  
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generate unintended costs for consumers and society.15 However, Professors 
Mofsky and Tollison failed to recognize the possibility that denial of the 
registration and consequent denial of access to the capital markets may have 
contributed ultimately to the poorer performance. Their critique of the 
Wisconsin study raised questions about the different time horizons held by 
different investors, noting that some investors trade for short-term gain and 
others for long-term gain.16 Their comments about the Wisconsin study apply 
equally to the Walker/Hadaway study. None of the studies reported offer 
reliable data from which one may determine that state security registration 
effectively protects the public from fraud. To the contrary, the studies may 
lead one to conclude that worthwhile stock issues were denied access to the 
capital markets.17 
After ninety years of state security registration, there still has been no 
credible showing that state security registration effectively protects the public 
investor from fraudulent schemes or creates any public benefit other than to 
provide revenue for the states. While the arguments for and against merit 
regulation have not changed appreciably, there are new factors to consider. 
The development of the Internet and the advent of online trading and e-
commerce, generally, have turned the markets inside out. 
The time has come, I believe, for the states to “think the unthinkable,” to 
scrap merit regulation completely and adopt instead a disclosure standard for 
those remaining instances in which registration is still required. 
Merit regulation simply does not work well. Far from being apodictic, the 
studies referred to above are inconclusive at best. At worst, the studies show 
that merit regulation, by denying access to capital, may be a contributing 
factor in hastening the demise of a fledgling enterprise. As a practical matter, 
most of the merit policies can be handled through disclosure, thus allowing 
the marketplace to make the decision. 
Inconsistency and uneven application of merit standards have always 
been, and will continue to be, a problem. Coordinated Equity Review, 
NASAA’s attempt to have all the states on the same page at the same time 
may help, but it is too little too late. For the kinds of offerings that have been 
left to state regulation, an issuer will not likely volunteer to use the 
coordinated equity review process. Before 1985, the inconsistency across the 
 
 
 15. James S. Mofsky & Robert D. Tollison, Demerit in Merit Regulation, 60 MARQ . L. REV. 
367, 370 (1977). 
 16. Id. at 372. 
 17. See The Brophy/Verga study, supra  note 10. The sample used in the Brophy/Verga study 
included data from six states. The findings further support the position that issues denied registration 
generally outperformed those approved, on a price per share basis.  
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states made “blue skying” an initial public offering fun, i.e., taking an “Apple 
Computer” and getting it approved in Texas, banned in Massachusetts and, 
faced with certain denial, avoiding such states as Illinois, Michigan, 
Missouri, and Wisconsin altogether. The challenge was to review the 
offering documents before filing, catalog the potential problems, and then bet 
on which states would approve and which states would deny. More than a 
few investors became irate when they could not participate in the Apple 
Computer offering because their state regulator had already made the 
investment decision. 
Professor Bateman, in reviewing the history of the Securities Act of 1933, 
observed that the first bills introduced in Congress were patterned after the 
state model and incorporated the merit standard philosophy.18 In the end, 
Congress rejected that approach in favor of the English disclosure 
philosophy, based on the belief that a federal qualification statute with merit 
standards would be unworkable and unreasonable, and that, in any event, it 
was not the best approach to security registration. Congress chose the 
disclosure philosophy as the best protection for public investors because it 
allowed each investor to make his or her own investment decision based on 
full information, without imposing an unreasonable restraint on legitimate 
business finance. Finally, the disclosure philosophy was considered essential 
to avoid the risk of implicit approval by the federal government of the merits 
of any securities offered for sale to the public, because all securities involve 
some degree of risk.19 
Defenders of the blue sky laws have relied upon U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions finding the laws to be a proper exercise of the police power of the 
state. However, times have changed appreciably since 1917, and perhaps the 
issue ought to be reexamined in light of today’s financial marketplace. In 
1917, the state laws were the only laws available, and recourse to the state 
laws was the only way for the courts to provide relief to aggrieved parties. As 
Bateman noted in 1973, millions of literate, educated investors consume 
countless investment periodicals and are furnished with a wide variety of 
investment services by the brokerage community. The flow of relevant 
investment information compelled by the federal securities laws has had a 
significant impact, and today’s investor is better informed than his pre-World 
War I counterpart. It is also abundantly clear that securities distribution 
systems and the securities markets generally are inescapably national and 
interstate in nature.20 
 
 
 17. Bateman, supra note 6, at 768. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See id . at 764. 
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I believe it is time to emulate Solomon and split the state regulatory 
scheme, retaining the licensing and enforcement at the state level, but 
eliminating state security registration. The state licensing functions relating to 
brokers, dealers, and advisers are certainly a defensible exercise of the police 
power. Similarly, enforcement of the fraud provisions of the state securities 
laws appears equally defensible. However, the security registration 
provisions, surely conflict with principles of interstate commerce and should 
either be eliminated entirely or, at the very least, made to conform to the 
federal model. 
 
 
 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss2/3
